28.11.16: Absturz Kolumbien

ANZEIGE

Petz

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08.11.2009
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ANZEIGE
Fuel Computations

A dispatcher at a large airline together with input from The Aviation Herald computed various flight plan possibilities with respect to distances and fuel needed according to Bolivia's law. During the accident flight the enroute winds averaged at a headwind component of 4 knots.

In summary it can be said, that flights from Santa Cruz (VVI) to Medellin (MDE) or Bogota (BOG) could not have been planned legally, even if the aircraft was equipped with pannier tanks. Even in optimistic computations the computed trip fuel alone, without any taxi, contingency, diversion or reserve fuel, would have exceeded the standard fuel tank capacity (9362kg).

The dispatcher computed three different flight plans, see in detail at the PDF:

Santa Cruz-Medellin Alternate Bogota with no payload: Trip Fuel 8,660kg, Release Fuel 11,838kg
Santa Cruz-Medellin Alternate Bogota optimistic weights: Trip Fuel 9,380kg, Release Fuel 12,461kg
Santa Cruz-Bogota Alternate Medellin optimistic weights: Trip Fuel 9,260kg, Release Fuel 12,578kg

Fuel Stop Possibilities

Along the route following possibilities were checked with respect of a possible fuel stop (rounded Great Circle distances used for first leg to fuel stop and second leg to Medellin):

- Cobija (Bolivia, SLCO, 500nm+1100nm): operating from sunrise to sunset only, not open anymore at estimated time of arrival
- Tabatinga (Brazil, SBTT, 900nm+700nm): Brazil did not permit flights from Brazil to Colombia for the Bolivia registered operator, in addition the aerodrome and fuel facilities would have been closed after 23:00Z
- Leticia (Colombia, SKLT, 900nm+700nm): The airport would be open 24/7, fuel services however officially only available until 00:30Z, too tight for estimated arrival
- Bogota (Colombia, SKBO, 1500nm+100nm): as seen above not legally possible

Summary: provided an arrangement with the fuel services in Leticia could have been reached, so that refuelling would have been possible after usual service hours, Leticia would have been an ideal fuel stop.



Crash: LAMIA Bolivia RJ85 near Medellin on Nov 28th 2016, electrical problems, no fuel, impact with terrain

 

Petz

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On Dec 26th 2016 Colombia's Aerocivil introduced their preliminary report in a press conference (the preliminary report itself was not released) stating, that the aircraft did not show any technical fault, there was no sabotage or suicide attempt. The evidence revealed the aircraft suffered fuel exhaustion. The crew was aware of their fuel status and considered fuel stops in Leticia (Colombia) and Bogota (Colombia), however did not decide to perform such stops. The aircraft was operated at a takeoff weight of 42,148 kg, maximum takeoff weight permitted 41,800 kg, this takeoff weight was not a factor into the accident however. According to cockpit voice recordings the first officer and observer repeatedly calculated the fuel and considered a fuel stop in Leticia but did not follow up as they did not know whether the airport was open. The aircraft features a system that activates an alarm if the fuel remaining was no longer sufficient for more than 20 minutes of flight, however, this system did not activate. 10 minutes prior to impact the crew requested priority for landing and selected the first stage of flaps. The aircraft began to turn and descend without ATC clearance causing separation problems with the other aircraft in the hold. 6 minutes prior to impact engine #3 is the first to flame out, 5 minutes prior to impact the crew selected the next stage of flaps and selected the landing gear down, the crew advised ATC ground services were not needed. Engine #2 fails. 3:45 minutes prior to impact all engines had flamed out, the aircraft was without power, the APU also failed due to lack of fuel. 2 minutes prior to impact the crew declared emergency reporting total power failure. The aircraft impacted Cerro Gordo at a speed of 230km/h (124 knots) below 9000 feet when they needed to be above 10,000 feet to safely cross the mountain.

 

Wolke7

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30.08.2010
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Das sieht ja so aus, als haette die Unsicherheit, ob Laeticia Airport geoeffnet waere, zu Fehlentscheidungen im Cockpit gefuehrt:
1. Nicht nachfragen, ob Laeticia geoeffnet ist.
2. keine Notfallalternative beruecksichtigt.
Alle weiteren Details sind Folgeerscheinungen der initialen Fehlentscheidung.