On Mar 11th 2017 The Aviation Herald became aware of a letter in Norwegian dated Feb 20th 2017 that Norway's AIBN sent to Norway's Ministry of Transport stating that after review of the available information the occurrence was rated an incident and is not being investigated by the AIBN.
The AIBN reported that the occurrence had not been reported to the AIBN prior to media contacting the AIBN. The AIBN secured data of the flight including communication, flight data recorder and radar data.
The AIBN reported that the flight had a number of hours delay due to weather at Oslo's Gardermoen Airport. The flight then received a slot to depart from Kristiansand. The aircraft was ready for departure about 5 minutes prior to the slot time assigned to the flight. With no other traffic around the aircraft received clearance to line up and wait as needed. The aircraft taxied into position and held, the park brake was set as a natural choice. Upon slot time the aircraft was cleared for takeoff, the engine power was increased for takeoff, due to the park brake still being set the takeoff configuration warning activated.
The first officer (881 hours total, 445 hours on type) accidentally shut down both engines, which resulted in the loss of electrical power for most systems depending on electrical power, the aircraft was powered only by battery. According to the flight data recorder the aircraft rolled for 20 meters and stopped.
Tower observed that the aircraft blacked out, but the exterior emergency lighting came on.
To restart the aircraft the crew first needed to start the APU, also needed to start the air conditioning and cabin pressure system. After some time both engines were restarted and the navigation systems of the aircraft were put back into operation (editorial note: the aircraft transponder's position registers are being supplied by the navigation systems, the transponder then transmits those position data, which showed a movement of 230 meters - the AIBN report now offers an explanation for this suggesting - without actually writing it - that the navigation system and its position data were no longer reliable when the engines were shut down).
As the aircraft was still ahead of the runway threshold, no recomputation of takeoff performance was needed. The pilots did not announce that cabin crew should take their seats for departure, and the takeoff roll began before cabin crew were seated and strapped in.
Following departure the aircraft began to climb to planned cruise level FL330. However, when the aircraft climbed through FL140 the crew received a warning concerning the cabin pressure and stopped the climb at FL150. The crew discovered that the cabin pressurization had not been turned on and engaged the cabin pressurization, however in such a way that cabin pressure could not quickly be recovered. The cabin pressure alert continued to sound for 5 minutes. The crew advised ATC they had a technical problem and requested to continue the flight to Oslo at FL150, however no priority and no assistance was needed at Gardermoen.
The AIBN reported that cabin crew heard continous alert sounds from the cockpit and felt at the same time that the cabin pressure was not normal. The purser attempted to contact the cockpit via Intercom, however, was unable to reach the cockpit crew due to the aircraft system assigning priority to the aural alerts over the Intercom. As the cabin crew could not get into contact with the flight crew and was worried about what was going on on the cockpit, the purser used the emergency access code to the cockpit and entered the cockpit, however, due to language problems could not get reasonable explanation as to what had happened. Cabin crew therefore, on own initiative, decided to don their oxygen masks.
Radar and communication data suggest that the flight progressed without any further difficulty from there on. After landing cabin crew left the aircraft.
